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2Abstract
The ability of developing countries to export to more developed parts of the world is
often associated with cheap labour.  But such very obvious economic advantage is not
always the end of the story.  A fuller account needs to consider the wider institutional
context.  In some instances trade unionism can be an important part of this.  This
paper addresses trade unionism with specific reference to workers employed in large
firms in Turkey that are significant exporters of consumer goods to the European
market.  The union examined is the largest union in the metal industry, an industry
that is a driving force in the Turkish economy, and a major centre of trade unionism
with over half a million of Turkey’s 3 million trade unionists.  The particular –
autocratic – character of this union is critically examined and located with reference to
wider forces of political economy and the specific constraints and difficulties to which
its members are subject.  Finally, the significance of this sort of trade unionism for
economic – and socio-political – development is discussed.
3The idea that less developed countries will one day inevitably catch up with those that
are presently more developed; or that increases in GDP in those countries will
necessarily trickle down to the poor are rightly disputed.  By contrast, few would take
issue with the idea that cheap labour is likely to be an important advantage to those
developing countries which seek to export to more developed ones.  Seen in this light,
however, the role of trade unions in those societies becomes a particularly interesting
one.  Strong and effective trade unions might be thought to undermine cheap wages
and increase labour costs.  On the other hand, to suppose that such trade unions can
only exist in these countries in so far as they are ineffectual is only to raise further
questions: how, then, is such trade unionism brought into existence? Why do workers
tolerate it? Why do workers join such unions? Why don’t they quit them?  These are
the essentially sociological questions that concern us in this paper.  Our aim is to
address them by examining one important trade union in Turkey, Turk Metal, which is
the major trade union in the metal industry in the Izmit triangle, itself the major centre
of Turkey’s export industry.
This paper necessarily begins by explaining how trade unions in Turkey are organised
into several different federations.  Then the position of Turk Metal, which belongs to
the largest of these federations, Turk-Is, is described, as is its operation in that part of
the metal industry which is situated in the Izmit triangle, a key location of Turkey’s
current industrialisation.  Case study evidence from four firms in the white goods and
car industries is then introduced and it is seen that criticism of the union by workers
focuses on its lack of responsiveness to their needs, lack of internal democracy and
dialogue.  This provokes the questions that are systematically addressed in the body of
the paper: how did the union come to its present prominence? And how is its
autocracy reproduced?  The answer to the first question is seen to be inseparable from
the policy and practice of the military regime which came to power in 1980 and which
paved the way for Turkey’s shift to export oriented industrialisation and the opening
to the free market economy.  The answer to the second question is seen to be found –
apart from the role that management plays in this process - in a mesh of legal and
illegal practices that constrain workers with respect to how they can influence the
union, whether they can choose not to join the union in the first place, or indeed even
leave it.
4Trade Unions in Turkey
There are four main union federations in Turkey - TURK-IS, DISK, MISK and HAK-
IS – and in addition some independent unions, which have relatively few members.
TURK-IS is the biggest federation. Founded in 1952, it spans 32 member unions and
has 2.2 million individual members.  All other federations have been formed by splits
from it in the 1960s and 1970s (Sakallioglu 1991).  It is sometimes regarded as an
American form of union.  This is not without reason: between 1960 and 1970 US
financial aid constituted a sum equal to the income that came to Turk-Is from its
membership dues.  There were frequent visits to the States by the leadership and other
training activities (Isikli 1987: 319).  Politically TURK-IS claimed a centre and
centre-left position in the 1970s with sympathies toward the CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk
Partisi or Republican People’s Party).  Today it occupies a centre-right position.  Its
formally declared aims include a commitment to ‘a high level of national democratic
secular and social and state structure based on Ataturk’s principles and the
Constitution’ (Article 3, Turk-Is Regulations).  It is mainly composed of right wing
unions but its constituent unions include also some which are left wing, notably the
petrol workers’ union, Petrol-Is.  Turk Metal is part of Turk-Is and is the union, which
is at the centre of this paper.
DISK (the Revolutionary Workers’ Trade Union Confederation) was founded in 1967
when several unions left TURK-IS, including those representing mineworkers, tyre
workers, press workers, workers in food stuffs and metal workers.  It now has 28
affiliated unions, covering around a third of a million individual members.  During the
1970s DISK was close to the Turkish Workers’ Party (Turkiye Isci Partisi) and at the
centre of a militant socialist trade unionism.  Today it adopts a rather less radical
stance but it is still regarded as leftwing among the federations.
MISK (the Federation of Nationalist Workers’ Union) is the smallest of the
federations.  Founded in 1970, it is a federation of far right wing trade unions
covering less than one per cent of those unionised. The independent unions cover a
similar proportion.
HAK-IS (the Confederation of Justice Seekers’ Trade Unions) was formed in 1976.
There are seven unions affiliated to the federation.  Before the 1980 coup it covered
over half a million members and currently has around one third of a million.  It is a
federation of Islamic unions.  It is sympathetic to the FP (Fazilet Partisi or Virtue
Party, the current embodiment of rightist Islamic values).  It has its main base
amongst companies which belong to MUSIAD, the Moslem industrialists federation.
Its constitution pledges to ‘respect national and moral values; to abide by the rule of
social order and rights; to create peace and harmony between workers and employers;
to upgrade the living conditions of workers and to enable them to fully utilise human
rights and freedoms and to create a prosperous and developed Turkey based on
national unity’ (Article 3, Hak-Is Regulations).
5The Metal Industry and Turk Metal
The Izmit triangle is an area that runs from Istanbul at its apex to Izmit and Bursa.  It
is the site of extensive industrialisation, which expanded in the 1980s as industry
spilled out of Istanbul in a second phase of development.  In 1999 and 2000 research
was conducted in four plants in or adjacent to the Izmit triangle as part of a larger
project.  Three of these plants were in the whitegoods industry; one was a major car
plant.  All of them were unionised by Turk Metal.  All are subject to the same
collective agreement, with average wages for a worker with five years service of circa
£300 a month, including bonuses, in 2000.
The Çayirova washing machine factory is owned by a large Turkish conglomerate.
This is one of the biggest whitegoods manufacturers in Europe. The plant produces
about one and a half million washing machines annually, of which 25 per cent are
exported.  It has over 50 per cent of the home market.
The Çayirova plant is situated at Gebze, near Izmit.  Just under 1,000 are employed in
the factory.  The plant is a well-laid out modern one, which has the status of a show
plant within the company.  The plant has invested heavily in new technology since the
end of a partnership with a German multinational in 1986.  Metal cutting and bending
units are highly automated.  There are robotic devices and numerically controlled
machines throughout the production process.  In the paint unit where metal frames are
painted automatically, workers are largely reduced to pressing buttons when
necessary. In the pre-assembly unit, most work tasks are highly automated through the
use of CNC machines.  However, in final assembly unit, most of the work is carried
out manually with a minority of women working side by side with the men.  In the
final quality control, the work tasks are again highly automated.  At the time of the
fieldwork the Çayirova plant had undergone considerable reorganisation of its
management, lean management having made for less managers in a flatter structure.
The second plant produces ovens.  Situated at Bolu, it is owned by the same
conglomerate.  Bolu produces over half a million ovens annually.  It has just over 50
per cent of the home market and 25 per cent of sales are now for export.
It is situated to the east of the Izmit triangle proper and is again a product of the
spillover of industry from Istanbul that occurred in the 1980s.  Just under 1,000 are
employed.  Bolu was scheduled for management re-organisation, but at the time of the
fieldwork this had not yet occurred.  There are more long service managers and
workers here than elsewhere.  Of the four factories Bolu is one of the most labour
intensive.  Although the company began to upgrade its technology in the mid 1990s as
it bid to concentrate more on the international market, most work has not been highly
automated with the exception of the metal cutting and bending unit where there are a
few computer controlled machines and CNC lathes and the paint unit where work
tasks are highly automated.  There are no women in the production process.  Part of
the shopfloor is set up for cellular production but this makes only a minor
contribution.
The third plant, at Çerkezköy, produces fridges.  It is part of a three-handed German-
Turkish joint venture company, which dates from 1996/7.  The plant has over a third
of the home market, producing around a million fridges annually and exporting 40 per
cent of them.  One of the two German partners is one of the biggest whitegoods
manufacturers in the world.  Situated to the west of Istanbul in Trakya (Thrace, the
6European part of Turkey), this plant was again a product of the industrial overflow
that stemmed from Istanbul in the 1980s.  Nearly 2,000 are employed in the
refrigerator plant at peak season, which is itself part of a much larger whitegoods
manufacturing complex which employs over 3,000.  Çerkezköy has recently
undergone a major management reorganisation which had stripped out the
management levels of deputies and assistant managers and in which the bottom level
of management consists of teamleaders appointed by management and in charge of
teams between 9 and 45.  Since the arrival of the German partner, who appointed a
German managing director, the plant, which hitherto had been starved of investment,
has benefited considerably from upgrades to its technology.  Most pre-assembly line
work in the paint section, in metal cutting and bending, in plastic cutting and in
moulding has been highly automated.   German managers claim the equipment used is
the same as that at the corporation’s factories in other countries.  Final assembly and
some sub assembly (where some women are employed) are labour intensive, but with
some final quality control again being highly automated.
The fourth plant is a car factory at Bursa.  The company is a joint venture in which the
two partners are a European company and a large Turkish holding company in
Turkey.  The company started production at Bursa in 1969.  It has 5,000 employees,
including about 4,000 manual workers.  It currently produces about 100,000 cars per
year.  In the past production has been mainly for the home market, though the plant’s
new model is aimed predominately at Europe.  It has six main production units: press
shop, engine, under-body, welding, paint and assembly, which includes pre- and final
assembly lines. Some new machinery and lathes have been introduced in all units and
in the press shop and paint units in particular.  Most of the work in the paint unit is
highly automated.  Generally, though, the production process is labour intensive.  15
km of conveyors run from the press shop to final assembly where there is a marked
absence of highly developed electronic devices and even relatively few powered hand
tools.
Workers in all four plants were asked how good managers and their union were at
keeping them up to date about proposed changes; providing them with the chance to
comment on proposed changes; responding to suggestions; dealing with work
problems; and treating employees fairly.  As can be seen from Table 1 (bottom row),
on average workers in each of the plants rated their management better than their
trade union.  On closer inspection it can be seen that they did so with respect to nearly
every item in nearly every plant, so that whichever way Table 1 is read management
comes out more highly rated than the trade union.  Management’s own attempts to
consult workers and to involve them have not gone very far.  The TQM that has been
implemented is of the hard rather than soft variety (Nichols, Sugur and Demir 2000).
There is no joint health and safety committee in any of the
7Table 1
How good managers and union are at Bolu Gebze Cerkezkoy Bursa all
keeping everyone up to date about proposed
changes  (% very good + good)
managers 78 54 32 50 54
union 60 51 22 38 43
providing everyone with the chance to comment
on proposed changes (% very good + good)
managers 63 35 36 48 46
union 46 30 18 32 32
responding to suggestions from employees (%
very good + good)
managers 76 72 60 60 67
union 56 53 20 30 40
dealing with work problems you or others may
have (% very good + good)
managers 94 77 76 72 80
union 70 68 26 40 51
treating employees fairly (% very good + good)
managers 82 53 52 56 61
union 66 62 28 38 49
average management score 79 58 51 58 62
average TU score 60 53 23 36 43
percentage difference in favour of management +19 +5 +28 +22 +19
Table 2
per cent Bolu n=50 Gebze n=53 Çerkezköy n=50 Bursa n=50 All n=203
manager 76 64 64 92 74
trade union 20 15 14 4 13
relatives /friends /other 4 21 22 4 13
8plants.  However, workers can see some attempt by management to acknowledge their
existence, and how they rate the union compared to their factory’s management is
readily conveyed by the systematic comparison.
Further evidence of the union’s relative failure compared to management comes from
a question we asked workers about what they would do if they had a grievance.
Actually, our intention in asking this question had been to assess the possible effect of
relations with hemsehri (fellow townspeople), since research conducted in earlier
years had shown this to play an important part in the lives of people in the expanding
cities (Ayata 1987).  Interestingly, as can be seen from Table 2, the question revealed
little role for hemsehri- but equally evidently, little role for the trade union.  Those
saying they would take their grievance to the trade union were a small, sometimes
very small minority.  In all plants the great majority of workers said that if they had a
grievance they would take it to management. .  In no plant did more than one in five
say they would go to the union and the proportion was sometimes very considerably
less than this: at Bolu 20 per cent favoured the union (76 per cent management); at
Gebze 15 per cent (64 per cent); at Cerkezkoy 14 per cent (64 per cent); at Bursa only
4 per cent (92 per cent).
The reliance on management is such that managers themselves sometimes complain
that workers come to them for help with personal disputes, for example about getting
fellow workers to pay back debts.  This might imply a considerable deference to
authority on the part of some workers and stands in contrast to that form of working
class consciousness according to which ‘you don’t take your problems upstairs’.
However, to talk to workers about their union and to consider their criticism of it is to
find that this centres very often on complaints about its lack of responsiveness to
workers’ needs and sometimes too its failure to act independently of management.  It
is not that these workers are uncritically pro-management and anti-union.  Rather it is
that they find their own union so unresponsive to their needs that the management
consults them more than their union does, and acts, as several of them put it, like ‘an
employer’s union’.
Bolu:
The trade union is inadequate. They should conduct a survey related to the problems
of workers, but they don't do this
There is no communication with workers. They aren't interested in our problems. I
haven’t seen the face of the union president
They don’t deal fairly in the elections. There is not enough notice to become a
delegate candidate. They have their list of candidates in the elections. They are not
successful in improving social rights
I have no relationship to the union except for my membership
Our trade union is an employer's trade union and does what the employer says
9Çayirova:
I see the union here as a puppet of the employer. They don’t have any dialogue with
the workers.  A union must develop a dialogue with the workers and defend the
worker’s right
A union should defend the worker’s right.  The union here is finished. They make
agreements in their own way.  They support the employer. They don’t do anything
about dismissals.  There was a decrease in dismissals after the German company
came here.  This firm appreciates the workers, but the union doesn’t.
They just take the membership fee.  Workers themselves must elect their
representatives, not have them come from the top.  The elections are showpieces
because the representatives’ list is made from the top and this list is accepted.  Most
workers don’t know when the election is
There’s no difference if there is a trade union here or not.  It’s an employer’s union
I have been here for 6 months. I haven’t had any contact with the union
Gebze:
Trade unions are very important organisations for workers.  But union officials can
make mistakes.  The big mistake in this plant is that the representatives are
appointed not elected
Our trade union isn’t good.  They don’t deal with worker’s problems. They don't
treat everyone the same. They are politically biased. They are not open to criticism.
They don’t tell us about elections for representatives. We don’t know when or how
they are appointed.
For me there is no trade union here
They don’t do anything. But they celebrate birthday and marriage anniversaries with
the company. The manager comes and congratulates them. The union must renew
itself.  We can’t elect our own representatives.
The union isn’t democratic.  The representatives are appointed.  The union must
integrate with the worker.  The representatives must be elected by the workers.
Bursa:
It’s useless. I don’t think it has any function in here. It doesn’t really matter to me
whether this union exists or doesn’t exist.  It should respond to workers’ demands.
I see this union as a parasite.  A union should always keep in touch with workers.
I don’t find this union successful.  A trade union should be transparent, and all
decisions should be taken together with the workers.
They don’t know anything about trade unionism.  They have become union officials
through someone’s help.  A union should always be on the side of workers when
they discuss things with the management, because we pay their salaries.
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I think nothing about this union. Does it really exist? Where is it? What is it? I can’t
see it.
The above criticism of the union is often focused on its lack of responsiveness to
workers’ needs, lack of internal democracy and dialogue.  The question therefore
arises of how the union has come to be the biggest union in the metal industry and
how its position in relation to its members is reproduced.  Part of the answer to this
second question is already suggested by some of the above quotations that refer to
internal union organisation and election procedures.  First, however, we will consider
how the union came to its present prominence.  To answer this, it is necessary to shift
our attention from plant level to that of the state.
The Coming to Its Current Prominence of Turk Metal.
In 1964, Bulent Ecevit, then Minister of Labour, had spoken as follows upon
presenting new trade union laws to Parliament:
In almost all the Western democracies, the rights we are about to grant the
Turkish worker with this law were only acquired after long and bloody
struggles…. There can be no doubt that by granting the Turkish worker these
rights without necessitating such struggles, you will have rendered history and
society a great service…. In the countries of the West, application preceded the
laws … with us, the laws will come first and the application will follow’ (cited in
Isikli 1987: 317-18)
Ecevit had been correct.  These laws had been a real step forward.  This is pertinent
here, for it has been argued that it was especially workers such as those considered in
this paper who benefited from such changes in the 1960s and 1970s – namely, those
who worked in large scale manufacturing firms that produced inter alia consumer
durables and cars with modern technology, often with foreign investment (Keyder
1987: 160-1).  These benefits had derived from a process of top down bureaucratic
reform however; and what the state gives, the state can take away.
At the end of the 1970s Turkey was in crisis.  For a variety of reasons the import
substituting industrialisation that had been based on the selective protection of the
domestic manufacturing sector had run into trouble.  The balance of payments effects
of adverse terms of trade, the shrinking world market for exports, rising oil prices and
reduced remittances from Turkish workers in Europe all pushed toward a reduction in
the imported inputs and technology without which higher levels of profitability and
economic growth could not be sustained (Keyder 1987).  Turkey was driven into the
hands of the IMF in 1978 and into a major stabilisation and structural adjustment
programme in January 1980.  In the midst of political turmoil, a military coup ensued
on 12 September 1980.  Turkey was then ruled by the National Security Council.
This marked a decisive moment in the modern history of trade unionism in Turkey,
and for Turk-Is and its affiliate Turk Metal.
In 1982 a new constitution placed major restrictions on the political activities of trade
unions and further weakening of trade unions ensued through the 1983 Trade Unions
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Act.  Unions were forbidden to pursue political objectives – in particular they were
forbidden to engage in political activities, to establish relations with political parties,
or to use the name or symbols of political parties.  Politically motivated strikes,
general strikes and sympathy strikes were all made illegal; so too were slowdowns,
sit-ins, and similar forms of concerted action.  Strikes and lock-outs were not
permitted during a state of war or full or partial mobilisation, and they could be
prohibited in the event of major disasters adversely affecting daily life and
temporarily restricted in the case of martial law or 'extraordinary emergency law'
circumstances.
Furthermore, a lawful strike likely to endanger public health or national security could
be suspended for 60 days by order of the government and be taken to compulsory
arbitration at the end of that period, if the parties to the dispute failed to reach an
agreement.  Strikes were prohibited over grievances arising from the interpretation or
application of collective agreements.  In addition new legislation denied the right to
unionise and to bargain collectively to civil servants and certain public employee
groups, including the newly created contract worker category in the state economic
enterprises.  During the first half of the 1980s wage settlements were taken over by
the Government controlled High Board of Arbitration, which systematically awarded
increases below inflation.  In a catch-all move against free collective bargaining, and
in particular of the right to strike, the 1982 Constitution had stipulated that the right to
strike ‘shall not be exercised in a manner contrary to the principle of goodwill, to the
detriment of society, and in a manner damaging national wealth’, the violation of
these conditions inviting a court injunction to halt the strike.
The 1970s had seen the unions, and most especially DISK, manifest a new militancy.
Strikes increased as did days lost.  Legislation protected workers from being fired at
will and imposed heavy costs on companies in the form of severance payments
awarded on the basis of seniority (Keyder 1987: 191) and in some larger factories
employers complained that it was not possible to sack workers.  The 1980 coup
reversed the gains made in the previous decade.  Boratav has rightly stressed that the
new measures were intended ‘to cause a significant decline in the value of labour
power’ (1990: 209).  Nor is there is any doubt about the short run success of this
policy.  Between 1970 and 1979 overall union density had risen from 16 per cent to
27 per cent.  By 1985 it was down to 9.5 per cent and by 1990 it was still only 10 per
cent (Cam 2001). Whereas strikes and days lost had increased in the decade up to
1980, they fell in the subsequent period.  Wages followed a similar course.  Between
1970-79 real non-agricultural wages in Turkey had risen over 50 per cent, the largest
gains being made in the second half of the decade.  In 1980 they fell by 30 per cent.
By 1984 they were back below the level they had been in 1975 a whole decade earlier
(compare Figures 1a and 1b).
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The political background to the coup is that in the 1970s the position of Turk-Is had
been challenged from the left by the more militant federation DISK.  When the coup
came, Turk-Is publicly welcomed the advent of the military government, and its
Secretary General took office as its Minister of Social Security.  This led Turk-Is to be
suspended by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU).  But the
new legislation was such that Turk-Is also came to enjoy a significant longer-term
advantage compared to other unions, and especially DISK.  The law conferred the
right on individuals to freely choose the union to which they should belong. But what
is crucial is that in 1980 the National Security Council closed down all the trade union
federations – except for Turk-Is.  Although the right to strike was not restored until
1983, this one union federation was allowed to operate again within months of the
coup.  The Islamic federation Hak-Is was treated only a little more harshly.  Favoured
by the Generals for its conservative nature, it was allowed to operate without
collective bargaining or the right to strike in 1981 and began to operate fully as a
confederation in 1983.  The nationalist federation MISK was reinstated in 1984.  But
DISK was treated very differently.  It remained banned until 1991.  In the meantime
most of its top union officials had been imprisoned and its property seized by the
state.  In 1981 the Military Court had prosecuted 1,477 DISK trade unionists, 78 of
them being charged with offences punishable by death.  Part of the Generals’ attempt
to curb the power of the left, the case went on for five years, at the end of which 264
trade unionists were given prison sentences ranging from five to fifteen years (Pekin
1996: 220).
A further component in the disadvantage suffered by DISK following the 1980 coup
(and an advantage for Turk-Is) derived from the requirement that trade unions must
qualify as national unions with a presence throughout one of a number of specified
industry groups –e. g. mining; textiles, metals.  In Turkey, trade unions cannot take
the form of craft unions or enterprise or plant unions and the new legislation decreed
that in order for a trade union to be entitled to bargain with a plant or company, it had
to represent at least 10 per cent of the workers in the industry and more than half the
workers in the plant or company.  These rules made it yet more difficult for those
unions previously affiliated to DISK to regain a foothold.  In fact, it gave those unions
Figure1a
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which got established first a great advantage – generally those of the centre and right
and especially Turk-Is.
Each of the trade union federations has constituent unions in the metal industry.
Leaving aside here the HAK-IS union, Oz-Celik, which has just under 100,000
members and the small MISK union, Turk Celik Sen, which fails to reach the ten per
cent bargaining threshold, the effects of the coup can be readily seen at the level of the
individual trade unions by reference to the history of the DISK and TURK-IS unions
in the industry.
The DISK union in the metal industry is Birlesik Metal.  The union has over 56,000
members.  It is the product of a 1993 merger between two unions, Maden-Is and
Otomobil-Is.  Maden-Is was founded after the first trade union act came into force in
1947.  The union affiliated to Turk-Is when the confederation came into existence in
1952.  In 1967 Maden-Is withdrew from Turk-Is and formed DISK with four other
unions.  Kemal Turkler, who had been the chairman of the union since 1964 also then
served as chairman of DISK until 1977 (he was murdered by rightists in an armed
attack in 1980).  So what happened to Maden-Is?  The military regime suspended
Maden-Is as a part of DISK and it was not re-opened until 19911.
The Turk-Is union in the metal industry is Turk Metal.  The union was founded in
1973 in Ankara and immediately affiliated to Turk-Is.  The union grew considerably
in the second half of the 1970s when it gained control of a few plants in big
companies in the industry.  But then, after the military coup the union gained
recognition in workplaces formerly unionised by the still banned Maden-Is.  In 1979
Turk Metal had over 60,000 members.  As a result of the coup and its aftermath it had
reached 200,000 by 1987 and now has 240,000.
In each and every one of the four plants the uneven nature of the banning of the
different union federations gave an advantage to Turk-Is and its constituent union
Turk Metal2.  The military coup and its aftermath therefore go a considerable way to
                                                          
1  The other trade union, Otomobil-Is, with which Maden-Is merged in 1993 to form the new union,
Birlesik Metal-Is, had been founded in 1963 and had been a member of Turk-Is from 1965 to 1974,
after which it withdrew from Turk-Is and became an independent union.  In 1979 Otomobil-Is signed
an agreement with Maden-Is for joint action on various issues.  The union was closed down by the
1980 coup and re-instated in 1983 as an independent union, in which capacity it increased its
membership.  It merged with Maden-Is and was affiliated to DISK in 1993.
2 The pattern of advantage for Turk Metal can be seen at work in each of the four plants.
Gebze: The Çayirova washing machine plant moved there from Istanbul in 1968.  It was unionised by
Maden-Is, a constituent union of DISK, which had been formed the previous year.  The plant remained
organised by Maden-Is until the 1980 military coup.  This union was then closed down.  In 1983-4,
DISK still being banned, the plant was unionised by Turk Metal.
Bolu: in 1983 the relatively new Bolu plant was unionised by Turk Metal which at this time was of
course part of the only major union federation in existence.
Çerkezköy: in the 1970s the plant had been unionised by the DISK union Maden-Is.  After the military
coup the union was closed.  In 1983-4 the plant was unionised by Turk Metal.
Bursa: initially, the car plant was organised by Maden-Is.  In the 1970s in the context of the
strengthening of the left and of violent clashes between left and right on the streets, there were serious
clashes between the Maden-Is and Turk Metal.  Two union members lost their lives.  Others suffered
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account for the coming to prominence of Turk Metal in these plants – a union which
espoused a very different ideology to DISK, which was the union to which those of
the plants which existed in the 1970s had been affiliated.  Mustafa Ozbek became
chairman of Turk Metal in 1975 and still holds this position.  He comes from
Kirikkale as do some of the union’s other leading officials.  Once a district of Ankara,
and now a city in its own right, Kirikkale is renowned in Turkey for its right wing
politics and support for the MHP (Milliyetci Haraket Partisi or Nationalist Movement
Party).  In 1980 Ozbek made a speech welcoming the coup, declaring that it had ‘torn
away the masks of those speaking of a confrontation between capital and labour’ and
that it had ‘initiated a period of national unity and harmony’ (Turkiye Sendikacilik
Ansiklopedisi 1996: 361).  In this he neatly paralleled the contribution made by the
body with which his union negotiates, the Turkish Metal Industrialists Union (MESS,
Metal Sanayicileri Sendikasi).  MESS welcomed the coup as ‘establishing an
atmosphere of peace and security in the country’.  (In December 1979 Turgut Ozal the
previous head of MESS, was appointed Under Secretary of the Prime Ministry.  The
key architect of Turkey’s journey into the free market economy in the 1980s, he was
to become Prime Minister in 1983 and serve as President of Turkey from 1991 until
his death in 1993.)
If the above events go a considerable way to account for the coming to prominence of
Turk Metal.  They cannot however explain how Turk Metal has reproduced its
position.  It is to this matter that we now turn.
The Reproduction of Union Autocracy
Turkey has experienced huge migratory flows from East to West over the last half
century and a more general shift of population from the countryside to the growing
urban areas (Peker 1996: 11).  Many of the workers in these plants therefore have
fathers who were peasants or whose grandfathers were.  The vast majority are
Moslem; a considerable proportion of them pray.  Attributes such as these are often
considered a recipe for conservatism by promoting reliance on authority and
unthinking acceptance.  Whatever the plausibility of such general assumptions it is
important to note that these workers have not blindly accepted their fate as far as Turk
Metal is concerned.  In each of the four plants, there have been attempts to leave the
union.
Gebze: in 1994 workers complained that when the company sacked around 200 of
them the union did nothing.  In 1998 following the results of the collective bargaining
of that year workers began to resign from Turk Metal and attempted to join Birlesik
Metal.  With inflation running at about 70 per cent, the union had promised a 90 per
cent pay rise and gained only an initial 43 per cent.  Hundreds of workers resigned
from the union and walked out protesting at the union’s failure.  Hundreds of
gendarme and police were drafted in to preserve order.  Following this about 40 to 50
were sacked by management.
                                                                                                                                                                     
serious injury.  At one point rightists entered the factory to intimidate Maden-Is members.  The
management preferred to recruit those with right wing connections and helped Turk Metal.  The police
intervened on a daily basis, also favouring Turk Metal.  Turk Metal began to displace Maden-Is and
gained control in 1978.  As we have seen, come the 1980 coup Turk-Is was not closed down, although
though there was no collective bargaining or right to strike.  But, with its funds and organisation intact,
it began to operate again in 1983, as did Turk Metal as its constituent union within the plant.
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Bolu: in 1986 some workers in Bolu tried to leave the union and join an independent
union Otomobil-Is (a breakaway from Turk-Is, which later (in 1993) then became a
constituent part of DISK).  The management sacked those active in this move.  From
memory workers put the number involved between 60 and 100.  In 1989 and 1990
another attempt at a breakaway from Turk Metal occurred, again with the intention of
joining the same independent union.  Again management sacked those active in this
attempt.  Again workers put the figure at between 60 and 100.  Up till this date there
had been no union branch in Bolu but only a branch office about 100 km away at
Sakarya.  The union set up a local branch.  At the same time however new workers
were recruited through the union from its stronghold in Kirikkale, Ankara.  Since then
Turk Metal has escaped further challenge.
Çerkezköy: the top branch officials again come from Kirikkale, Ankara.  In the
second half of the 1980s Otomobil-Is started to make inroads into the factory but
could not legally displace Turk Metal.  In this plant, too, the results of the 1998
collective bargaining unleashed profound dissatisfaction with Turk Metal and workers
left the plant, thousands marching 3 km from the company’s various plants to town
centre where the office is located of the Public Notary (who is charged with the
registration and de-registration of union membership).  Management did nothing for a
few days when union officials and the local Governor attempted to quieten things
down and coax workers back to work.  It then issued an ultimatum: either workers had
to re-register their membership of Turk Metal or lose their job.  Around a hundred lost
their job.
Bursa: in 1994 the company sacked thousands, the number employed reducing from
about 9000 in 1993 to around 3000 by 1996.  Failure of the union to intervene led to
widespread disaffection.  In 1998 workers played a prominent part in the wider
reaction to the deal struck by Turk Metal.  There was a massive walk out.  Thousands
marched the 5 km to the Public Notary’s office in Bursa to resign and join the DISK
affiliated Birlesik Turk Metal (United Metal Workers’ Union).  Management at Bursa
followed the same course pursued at Cerkezkoy.  Putting its weight behind the union,
it threatened workers with the sack if they did not stay with Turk Metal.  After
workers had re-joined the union between 200 and 300 were sacked – according to
management because of the world crisis of that year and, according to some workers
to clear out the activists.  According to Turk Metal, at national level, 8000 workers
switched to Birlesik Turk Metal in 1998 and then switched back.  According to
Birlesik Turk Metal, 40,000 did so.
Apart from anything else the above account serves to warn us that in interpreting the
results in Table 1 it is necessary to keep in mind that the workers interviewed were
not an unbiased cross section.  First, those who had been active in seeking to switch
unions were almost certainly under-represented by virtue of past dismissals.  Second,
and probably to the same effect, management sought to screen out potential militants
when selecting new workers.  As one of the managers put it to us: ‘Of course we have
to consider “political issues” as well.’  Third, pro-Turk Metal workers had been
deliberately recruited through the union from its ideological strongholds.
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It remains to be considered why workers join the union in the first place.  Why, if they
are disaffected, as some of them certainly are, have they not reformed the union from
within?  And why have they not left it?
Why did workers join this trade union?  In Turkey the Trade Unions Act of 1983
stipulates that the hiring of workers must not be made subject to any condition as to
their membership of a union, individuals having the right to become a member of a
trade union or not.  These rights imply that there can be no ‘closed shop’.  On the face
of it, then, the question of why these workers joined the union is something of a
puzzle.  But it isn’t.  In practice, there is a closed shop.  In all the four plants there is
100 per cent membership of Turk Metal for permanent workers3, which is effected by
recruits being sent to the union office to sign on as part of the process of being taken
on by the company.  The procedure is part of standard practice, it is as unproblematic
as going to the hospital to register for social security purposes: in fact it occurs as part
of the same routine.  Why do workers put up with this?  A metal industry manager put
it like this: ‘There is much unemployment.  These are good jobs.  Of course workers
join.  They dare not refuse’.
Why is it that workers themselves do not fight more to change the union from the
inside?  One part of the answer is that the union President, Ozbek, rules Turk Metal
with an iron hand and union officials are Ozbek’s men. They are tied to the union, and
to him, by a mixture of personal loyalty and nationalist ideology.  Photographs of him
striking powerful poses dominate Union offices.  The grey wolf symbol of the MHP,
the party closely associated with the street violence of the 1970s and attacks on the
left, is part of the union emblem (despite the illegality of this).  The union publishes
books about the emergence of the Turks from central Asia and about the Turkic grey
wolf myth (Caglar 1990).  Ozbek is also President of the Federation of Eurasian Metal
Workers; an entity based on the Turkic republics in Central Asia.  Union officials talk
in terms of ‘Our great President says …’
There are also material interests at stake.  There are visits abroad for officials on
union business.  The chairs of branches can be invited to union meetings usually held
in five star hotels at holiday resorts.  At rank and file level, Turk Metal organises
holidays in the union education resort in Northern Cypress and on the Aegean and
Mediterranean coast of Turkey for workers and their families, all expenses paid.
There is a large education and training centre in Ankara. All these are mechanisms
whereby loyalty can be bought and retained.  These rewards are not for everyone –
indeed they are part of what makes many resent the union and the way it operates.
These feelings are particularly strong at Çerkezköy:
                                                          
3  All permanent direct production workers are members of the trade union.  Workers serve a
probationary period usually of six months to a year prior to becoming permanent.  At
Cerkezkoy the seasonal nature of fridge production means that around 200 people are
recruited on a temporary basis.  These are often students from local colleges working on
placement in the summer months.  Indirect production activities such as packing, security,
catering and cleaning also make use of tacheron labour. Tacheron workers represent
between 10 and 15 per cent of the workforce of the three plants.  They are employed for less
than 11 months to avoid the employer’s obligation to pay compensation on dismissal; they
lack legal contracts, receive only the minimum wage, are not trade union members and have
no holiday entitlement (Cam 1999; Sugur et al 1999).
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It pretends to be active when collective bargaining comes round.  Apart from that
they do nothing.  Strangers came to work here from places like Kirikkale and
Yozgat.  They [union officials] protect their own men and hemsehries (fellow
townsmen) from the cities of Kirikkale and Yozgat. They get them to come and
settle here and show favouritism toward them.
I wish this union would leave here. Our union sends around 50 or 60 people to its
holiday resorts in Antalya and North Cypress.  But they’re all from Ankara – what
a coincidence! I resent having to pay my membership fee.
The potential for favouritism and an ability to ride roughshod over the membership
inheres in the union’s internal structure, as a consideration of its various levels makes
plain.
Shop stewards: according to 1995 trade union law, workplaces with 1-50 employees
can have no more than one shop steward; those with 51-100 two; those with 101-500
three; those with 501-1000 four; those with 1001-2000 six; and those with over 2000
no more than eight.  They are formally appointed by the head of the union branch.
However, officials in Turk Metal try to hoodwink workers with their apparently
superior legal knowledge and claim that the law actually requires shop stewards to be
appointed by the union.  What they do not point out is that it is perfectly in order to
have an election first and that other unions do just this.  When asked why
representatives weren’t elected prior to being formally appointed, a head union
official explained:
The shop stewards and the head of a union branch should work in harmony. If they
do not work in harmony, it will adversely affect workers anyway. I mean if a
steward, who is elected, has a problem with me; he may not bring the workers’
problems to me.  In other words, if there is a disagreement between the head of a
union branch and a shop steward, he could create problems in the enterprise, and
the branch would not even hear about it …. I mean if I don’t appoint a steward who
works in harmony with me, I may not hear anything about the problems over there.
He can even misinform the people who work there, make it as if the union is not
interested in workers’ problems. A successful labour unionism is based on
teamwork. In a metaphorical sense, you can only be successful if the goalkeeper
keeps goal well, the one in the middle field plays well and if the forward scores the
goal, otherwise it’s very difficult to be successful.
Typically the stewards who do get appointed are right wing people who can provide
an upward chain of communication to the local branch.
Delegates: local union officials are elected by delegates (a separate position from that
of shop steward) who are also supposed to monitor the activities of local union
branch.  Delegates are directly elected by workers for three years – one to every 40
workers.  However, the local union office provides a slate of approved candidates and
it is an uphill struggle for workers to elect delegates who have not been approved.
Workers report that when delegates on an opposition list were actually elected in
Istanbul, the union closed down the branch.  In any case, workers in all four plants are
not well informed about elections and have no faith in their ability to elect non-listed
delegates.
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Branch union officials: these inhabit a separate world to workers; and they act as the
delegates of their branch to elect the head office union officials.
Suffice to say that to make in-roads into this structure is extremely difficult.  But if it
is very difficult to fight inside to change things, then what of flight?
Why don’t workers leave the union and join one that is more responsive to their
needs?  As we have seen, this has been tried.  So far though such moves have not met
with success and they are difficult to achieve (in some respects even more difficult
than the predominantly European and North American literature would suggest:
Lerner 1961; Hemingway 1978).  In order to join a new union each individual
member has to visit the office of the Public Notary and complete a formal procedure.
This requires that 3 million TL be paid to leave the current trade union and a further
11 million TL be paid to join the new one.  This cost is itself a disincentive.  At 2000
prices 14 million TL was the equivalent of five days’ pay for a probationary worker
and approximately two days’ pay for an average permanent worker.  In addition of
course the new union has to demonstrate it has 50 per cent plus one of the plant and
10 per cent of the industry.  In addition to this managers (like the union) confuse
workers on legal issues.  Workers in these plants have been told that it is illegal for
management to bargain with another union, which has some credibility in that once an
agreement has been made it remains enforceable for two years even if the workers
leave the union and join another one.  However, the reality is that if it wants to do so
the management can deal with a new union, provided it meets the specified
thresholds.  To this has to be added that if workers do leave they fear they will face
the sack.  And, according to other unions, if workers do join another union
surreptitiously, and Turk Metal finds out, it has been known to pass the word to
management and get them sacked.
As already reported, managements have supported the TURK-IS union against DISK
and this support, according to credible reports from workers, included removing
active trade unionists from the labour force. Management support for Turk Metal is
not unequivocal however.  For management, Turk Metal has its positive side.  Union
officials regard the new management methods such as TQM, which have been
introduced in all these plants, as a means toward producing a bigger cake.  As one
trade union official put it:
We should base our relationship on dialogue.  The factory is ours- including
unions, employees and employers regardless of differences between them.  Our
principle is: ‘We should make the cake bigger and then take our share’
In line with this is the union’s practice of leaving management to manage on the shop
floor.  In this respect, managers at all the plants refer to Turk Metal being ‘no
problem’.  Indeed, it is said that ‘they understand our problems’.  Turk Metal is
therefore favoured in preference to a union that might threaten something worse in
terms of militancy.  Even in the eyes of management, however, Turk Metal has a
negative side, an aspect that in the long run might prove a mixed blessing.
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Managers are critical of the union’s lack of internal democratic procedures.  ‘The
unions need to change themselves radically’ says one:
In fact, we [the company] have already talked about that issue: we ourselves did
some work about what the unions need to do, what the union management needs
to do, then we tried to pass the decisions of some of our meetings to them in order
to make them more effective, more participatory, to make the people feel their
need for a union.
That managers sometimes express concern at the lack of participation in the union is
at one level pragmatic; they want to contain any trouble that might otherwise well up
from below; they need a union that can deliver the membership.  In some cases,
though, the concern clearly goes beyond this and stems from a social democratic
regard to the need to strengthen the institutions of civil society.  Either way, such
concern amply underlines the absence of internal democracy.  But this point about the
need to develop the institutions of civil society has wider implications for Turkey and
for other social formations that share similar characteristics and is returned to below.
Discussion
We hope it is clear from this paper that these workers’ relations to their union cannot
be understood in terms only of some general orientation (e.g.passivity/ Asiatic
obedience) or in terms of the operation of some general sociological law (Michel’s
‘iron law of oligarchy’ being a classic example of this).
As far as the first possibility is concerned, these workers are Turkish and it is
tempting for Westerners to find ready-made explanations for behaviour in generalities
about Islamic culture.  It has long been argued for example that Islam is likely to
promote a static way of looking at the world which in turn discourages departures
from orthodoxy and thereby promotes reliance on authority so that employees
themselves put up with a high degree of centralisation of authority, this neither
disturbing them nor resulting in major organisational conflict (Lauter 1969: 94).  Even
to the extent that it might be thought that such assumptions have some validity they
really do make it difficult to account for the very different character of labour
relations in different periods (as we saw there was a pronounced change in Turkey
between the 1970s and 1980s).  This is why rather than follow this general line of
interpretation consideration was directed above to the specific constraints and
difficulties to which these workers are subjected.
As far as the second possibility is concerned, there is a very long established literature
on trade unions that can be traced back at least as far as the Webbs at the end of the
nineteenth century (Webb 1897: 161) and which has come to occupy an important
place in modern Weberian-influenced social thought via the idea of an ‘iron law of
oligarchy’ (Michels 1915).  Thankfully, attempts to counter the unqualified pessimism
of such thinking continue to the present day (Voss and Sherman 2000).  This paper is
located in this counter tradition in so far as it rejects any unqualified law of
sociological tendency towards union autocracy.  It has been seen of course that the
leadership of Turk Metal most certainly attempts to reproduce itself and that it has
been successful in this.  But it has been argued that there is a specific historical
explanation for its present prominence which stems from history of the Turkish state,
most especially from the consequences of the 1980 coup, and from the interests of the
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capitalist firms that recognise the union.  And it has also been seen that workers’
continued membership of a union that effectively denies them a voice has not been for
lack of attempts to quit it, attempts that have been frustrated amongst other things by
the actions of the employers and legal requirements.
In short, the intention throughout is to get behind the generalities – whether these
relate to the reduction of the position of labour in developing countries to cheap
labour alone, to generalisation about universal tendencies to oligarchy in trade unions
or the invocation of conservative notions about an Islamic mentality - and to examine,
in the case of this one important trade union in Turkey, the specific practices and
regulations that conspire to reproduce both the position of the union hierarchy within
the union and of the union within the industry.  A series of specific obstacles existed
which tended to frustrate workers’ attempts to change the union.  The 1980 coup had
had the effect of reversing the gains made in the previous decade and, in the longer
term, of facilitating a trade union structure in the metal industry which frustrated the
development of workers’ democratic capacities.  Despite this, workers have attempted
to bring about change in the all of the plants, so that there is no justification here to
resort to what Gouldner nicely summed up as ‘metaphysical pathos’ (1955: 496-507).
There is also some evidence that external leverage, applied by trade unions outside
Turkey, has had some success4.
If the voices of workers in these plants have been largely rendered ineffective there is
no reason to depict them as inherently apathetic and no reason either to assume that
they have always accepted their lot in the past or that they always will do so in the
future.  This said, however, it is undeniable that these workers are presently subject to
the power of a trade union autocracy.  In relation to this, some further issues arise that
have a wider significance both for developing countries such as Turkey and for
comparative political economy.
With respect to the development of Turkish society, whereas it is perfectly evident
that the sort of trade unionism described in this paper does not lend itself at all readily
to a politics of worker mass mobilisation, it is also deficient when judged against
another sort of politics – one indeed that is publicly favoured by certain elements of
big capital in Turkey.  In 1980 Turkey shifted from a policy of import substitution to
one of export orientation and the opening of domestic markets.  Subsequently there
has been increasing exposure to international competition.  The employers’ federation
TUSIAD, which is essentially an organ of big capital, now sees advances in the
liberalisation of society as a necessary complement to the economic liberalisation,
which it urged upon the Turkish state in the 1980s.  The signing of a Customs Union
Agreement with the EU in 1995 has done much to stimulate such thinking and to lead
to renewed advocacy of western democratic forms.  As TUSIAD’s Board of Directors
                                                          
4 During the 1970s and in the 1998 struggles DISK had sought the help of unions in Italy in
connection with the car firm and in France in connection with another car firm, Renault.  In the
1970s the French unions were successful in putting pressure on Renault, which was a
contributory factor that helped Maden-Is keep its position until the military coup in 1980.  At
the Bursa plant, the Italian unions did not prove as helpful as the French unions had been at
Renault, so the position of Maden-Is was relatively weaker.  In 1998 even though the plants
were now both organised by Turk Metal, DISK again looked to French and Italian unions for
help.  The same pattern repeated itself.  The French unions were successful in exerting
pressure and Renault sacked less than a dozen workers.  At the Bursa factory in our survey
no comparable support was forthcoming.
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put it in their Foreword to the organisation’s Perspectives on Democratisation in
Turkey (TUSIAD 1997) ‘to become fully integrated in Europe, a broader application
of democracy in economics and politics is required, and this is a pre-condition’.  Such
advances, even as seen by the employers’ organisation, include inter alia the need for
improvement in the position of trade unions.  For instance, TUSIAD noted critically
that in Turkey ‘it is [too] easily possible for a meeting or demonstration to be deemed
illegal’ and ‘in most cases of decisions to postpone or ban, no need is even felt to
indicate a reason’; it also endorsed moves in the 1990s to permit trade unions to hold
meetings outside their own purposes and aims and thus to contribute to the democratic
purpose more fully.  Such liberalisation with respect to trade unions (and of course
with respect to other aspects of life) is sorely needed.  Yet if there has been a need to
strengthen the rights that trade unions have in terms of their relation to the state, there
has also been a need in some cases to strengthen their internal democratic processes,
which is the issue upon which this paper has concentrated.
Following the calamitous earthquake that shook Turkey in 1999 commentators inside
and outside the country frequently expressed regret at the lack of developed
institutions in civil society.  The enhancement of internal union democracy is itself a
potentially important contribution to the development of such institutions.  For to the
extent that workers can engage in a collective democratic practice at their place of
work the chances for the emergence of a more fully developed civil society might be
thought less bleak.  It is on just this point, however, that the progressive line of big
capital in Turkey on workers’ rights presently meets its limit.  For it is in fact some of
the very same employers who give public assent at national level to increased freedom
for trade unions who simultaneously tolerate the autocratic mode of operation of Turk
Metal in their own factories.  It remains to be seen if and when these same employers
who give public assent to the view that a broader application of democracy is required
in economics and politics will extend an unequivocal welcome such changes on their
own shopfloors.
With respect to the wider significance for comparative political economy, it is not
possible to understand the development of the part of the metal industry in Turkey
that is dominated by big capital only in terms of low wages.
The wages paid are certainly low by the standards of advanced capitalist societies and
this is of course a very important factor that induces foreign companies to set up joint
ventures.  But the actual configuration of production relations entails more than this; it
also entails an autocratic trade unionism, and to explain how this has come about
requires an historical account of the restructuring of Turkish trade unions by the
military regime, which in turn paved the way for a shift from import substitution to
export orientation.  In other words, what we have here is a specific example of how
production in a developing country is effected by political means and cannot only be
understood in terms of economic relations.
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